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Anti-Money Laundering Regulations:
A Burden on Financial Institutions
Duncan E. Alfordt
I. Introduction
Drug trafficking has become an increasingly international crime
problem. Out of a total annual world drug trade estimated to be over
$500 billion, an estimated $100 billion is laundered each year by drug
traffickers in the United States alone.' Money laundering renders the
underlying crime of drug trafficking lucrative by making the proceeds
of the drug sale available for use in legitimate business. Both domestic
and international efforts to criminalize money laundering have placed
increased regulatory burdens on commercial banks and other financial
institutions, which are then passed on to customers through higher
fees or lower interest rates.
Money laundering is the "process by which one conceals the exist-
ence, illegal source or illegal application of income, and then disguises
that income to make it appear legitimate."2 Money laundering is an
essential part of a drug operation because it allows criminals to use the
funds generated by drug sales in legitimate business.
3
Law enforcement authorities have focused on prohibiting and
prosecuting money launderers as a method of decreasing the overall
amount of drug trade and trafficking. An increasing number of na-
tions have passed laws prohibiting the laundering of drug money.4 As
t Associate, Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta, Georgia; University of North CarolinaJ.D. with
Honors, 1991; University of Virginia, B.A., 1985.
1 Global Money Laundering Rules Seen Needed to Reduce Drug Profit Flows, Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 56, at 581 (Mar. 25, 1991) [hereinafter Global Rules]. See also NAT'L INST. OF JUS-
TICE, RESEARCH PLAN MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TASK FORCE 51 (1991).
2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED
CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984) [hereinafter CASH
CONNECTION].
3 Peter E. Meltzer, KeepingDrug Money from Reaching the Wash Cycle: A Guide to the Bank
Secrecy Act, 108 BANKING L.J. 230, 230 (1991); Geoffrey W. Smith, Competition in the European
Financial Services Industry: The Free Movement of Capital Versus the Regulation of Money Launder-
ing, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 101, 128 (1992).
4 See, e.g., Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 114, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5344 (1988
and Supp. IV 1992); Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, Tit. I, Subtit. H,
100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314-5326) (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)); Housing and Community Development Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, tit. XV,
106 Stat. 3672 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., & 31 U.S.C.). As part of
this Act, Congress passed the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
drug trafficking and money laundering have become international
problems, nations have collaborated in international efforts to control
and criminalize money laundering. 5
Bank officials in the United States are required to monitor all
transactions with the bank for those suspected to be related to money
laundering and to report the details to law enforcement authorities.
To complicate matters, bank officials, at the same time, must be careful
not to violate the duty of confidentiality that they owe to their
customers.
6
This Article explores the increasing regulatory burden on banks,
in particular, U.S. banks, due to enhanced law enforcement efforts to
combat money laundering. In Part II, the Article will briefly describe
money laundering techniques, and then, in Part III, it will analyze sev-
eral international agreements aimed at combatting money launder-
ing-the 1988 United Nations Convention, 7 the Basle Committee
principles, and the report of the G-7 Task Force.8 The European Con-
vention 9 and the Money Laundering Directive of the European Com-
munity10 are discussed in Part IV, and Part V examines model
legislation adopted by the Organization of American States.1 ' The
Article in Part VI will then briefly describe the principal anti-money
laundering statutes in the United States and will analyze the recently
enacted Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act which raises the
stakes for banks that are convicted of money laundering violations.
This section will also include a discussion of the particular difficulties
when dealing with wire transfers. In Part VII, the Article concludes
that the increased regulatory burden and costs borne by banks (and,
ultimately, bank customers) may not outweigh the benefits of hinder-
ing money laundering and decreasing the amount of drug trafficking.
550, 106 Stat. 4044 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., & 31 U.S.C.)
(Supp. IV 1992) [hereinafter the Annunzio-Wylie Act]; Franco Taisch, Swiss Statutes Concern-
ing Money Laundering, 26 INT'L LAw. 695 (1992). The G-7 Task Force and U.N. Convention
require signatory states to criminalize money laundering. See infra notes 90-106 and accom-
panying text discussing the G-7 Task Force and notes 40-73 and accompanying text discussing
the U.N. Convention.
5 See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. ESCOR, 6th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15 (1988),
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter U.N. Convention]; Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds from Crime, Sept. 12, 1990, Council of Europe,
Europ. T.S. No. 141, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991) [hereinafter European Convention].
6 Several states including New York have recognized this duty of confic :ntiality. See,
e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961); Suburban Trust Co. v.
Waller, 408 A.2d 758 (Md. App. 1979).
7 U.N. Convention, supra note 5.
8 14 PAUL PILECKI ET AL., BANKING LAW 217-26 (Supp. 1992).
9 European Convention, supra note 5.
10 Council Directive 91/308 on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the
Purpose of Money Laundering, 1991 OJ. (L 166) 77 [hereinafter Directive].
11 Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug Traf-
ficking and Related Offenses, OEA/ser. L./XIV.2/CICAD/INF.58/92 (May 23, 1992) [here-
inafter Model Regulations].
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II. Money Laundering-Definition and Techniques
Successful money laundering is an essential part of drug traffick-
ing and other criminal operations because it hides the illicit source of
criminal proceeds and frees the funds for use in the legitimate econ-
omy.12 Money laundering essentially consists of three stages: (1) the
placement of money, (2) the layering of money, and (3) the integra-
tion of money. 13 The placement of money refers to the physical dispo-
sal of cash into a financial institution.1 4 The layering of money refers
to the transfer of money through several accounts or institutions in
order to separate the money from its original illegal source.1 5 The in-
tegration of money refers to the shifting of funds to a legitimate busi-
ness. 16 The money laundering process is most vulnerable to detection
by law enforcement authorities during the placement stage when the
money is first deposited in a financial institution. 17 It is at this initial
stage that U.S. law enforcement authorities have focused their efforts
by requiring banks to make currency transaction reports (CTRs) when
cash is deposited at a bank.1 8
Money launderers use various techniques to hide the illegal
source of funds. The simple method of changing small denominations
of bills into larger denominations eases the physical transport of the
money.' 9 Because U.S. banks must report currency transactions over
$10,000, money launderers use wire transfers to hide the source of il-
licit funds.20 Bank-to-bank wire transfers of legitimate funds are nearly
impossible to distinguish from transfers of illegal funds. 21 Addition-
ally, international wire transfers of large amounts of funds through fic-
titious offshore entities are often used to hide the original source of
the funds.22 Real estate transactions and real estate developments pro-
vide another means by which money launderers can repatriate funds
from abroad.23
Money launderers on occasion organize smaller boutique banks to
launder drug money, which in turn deal with correspondent banks
and, at the direction of money launderers, wire money through several
12 Meltzer, supra note 3, at 231.
13 Id.
14 A financial institution includes commercial banks, savings and loans, credit unions,
and savings banks.
15 Meltzer, supra note 3, at 231.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1988); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1992).
19 CASH CONNECTION, supra note 2, at 8.
20 Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1988); Meltzer, supra note 3, at 246. Banks
must report most currency transactions greater than $10,000 unless the customer is exempt
from the reporting requirements. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1992).
21 BARBARA WEBSTER & MICHAEL S. MCCAMPBELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL
MONEY LAUNDERING: RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION JOIN FORCES 5 (1992).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 6.
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different accounts to avoid detection by law enforcement authorities. 24
Another money laundering technique is the use of front compa-
nies, especially companies that are exempt from the currency report-
ing requirements, 25 to take in funds from drug sales and intermingle
them with funds from legitimate businesses. 26 Money launderers' use
of companies exempt from the CTR requirement has allowed banks to
be unwitting accomplices to money laundering. Eliminating exemp-
tions for certain businesses from the CTR requirement is unrealistic,
however, given that the U.S. government already receives over 600,000
CTRs per month.2 7
Money launderers also use other various vehicles to launder
money.28 A person wishing to hide his identity as owner of funds may
open numbered accounts in certain foreign jurisdictions. The deposi-
tor's only contact with the bank is with his account manager, and all
correspondence refers to the account number, not the account
name.29 Depositors may set up a trust with only the trustee's identity
known to the bank. In addition, depositors can set up a corporation
that issues bearer shares.30 Only the attorney creating the corporation
would know the true identity of the owner of the shares.31
III. International Agreements on Money Laundering
In the past, drug traffickers used domestic banks to launder their
drug proceeds. As drug trafficking and the corresponding amount of
cash to be laundered grew, drug traffickers began to use international
banks as vehicles for money laundering because domestic banks could
not handle the volume of cash without being detected by law enforce-
ment authorities.32 The internationalization of drug trafficking is a re-
cent phenomenon aided by improved technology, particularly in
telecommunications, and the increased mobility of persons.33
The international money laundering process is more complicated
than a purely domestic operation. First, a drug trafficker must move
24 Patrick O'Brien, Tracking Narco Dollars: The Evolution of a Potent Weapon in the Drug
War, 21 INTER-AM. L.R. 637, 671 (1990).
25 Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (1988). Certain types of businesses, predomi-
nantly retail businesses, handling large amounts of currency (such as retail stores, coin laun-
dries, and restaurants), may obtain exemptions from the reporting requirements.
26 O'Brien, supra note 24, at 669.
27 Id.
28 RichardJ. Gagnon, Jr., International Banking Secrecy: Developments in Europe Prompt New
Approaches, 23 VANn. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 653, 661-66 (1990).
29 Id
30 Bearer shares are shares of capital stock that are not registered in the shareholder's
name, but rather can be redeemed or sold by the bearer with no further owner
identification.
31 Gagnon, supra note 28, at 661-66.
32 Smith, supra note 3, at 123-24.
33 Hans G. Nilsson, The Council of Europe Laundering Convention: A Recent Example of a
Developing International Criminal Law, 2 CRiM. L.F. 419, 419-20 (1991).
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the drug proceeds from the United States to a foreign bank account.3 4
The drug trafficker can do this by smuggling the cash abroad, sending
it via courier, or sending it by electronic funds transfer. Next, the drug
trafficker must legitimize the money by depositing it in a foreign bank
account or securities account, or by investing it in a dummy corpora-
tion.3 5 Money launderers are more frequently using financial institu-
tions in jurisdictions with strong bank secrecy laws such as Hong Kong,
Luxembourg, and Austria, in order to avoid detection by law enforce-
ment authorities from other jurisdictions.3 6 Finally, the money must
be repatriated to the United States to complete the operation. This
repatriation can be accomplished by wire transfer.3 7
As international money laundering increases and nations begin to
cooperate in combatting money laundering, money launderers will
move to nations outside the cooperative scheme. As a result, money
laundering operations will be forced to centralize and thus will be
more susceptible to detection.3 8 Eastern Europe has been mentioned
as an attractive money laundering center as those countries develop a
financial system and move toward currency convertibility.3 9
A. United Nations Convention
Nations have joined forces in several international efforts to com-
bat drug trafficking by criminalizing money laundering. The first such
cooperative effort was the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which was adopted at a United
Nations conference held in Vienna from November 25 to December
20, 1988. The agreement specifically focused on money laundering in
drug trafficking operations. 40
The U.N. Convention evolved from two previous multilateral
agreements: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs adopted in
196141 and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances adopted in
1971.42 These two conventions focused "primarily on limiting the sup-
ply of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances to amounts required
by states for scientific and medical purposes so as to prevent their di-
34 WEBSTER & MCCAMPBELL, supra note 21, at 3-4.
35 Id
36 Global Rules, supra note 1, at 582. Bank secrecy laws generally prohibit banks from
disclosing information on a customer's account to anyone, including law enforcement au-
thorities, without the customer's specific permission.
37 WEBSTER & MCCAMPBELL, supra note 21, at 3-4.
38 O'Brien, supra note 24, at 676.
39 Experts at International Conference Warn About Money Laundering Threat in Eastern Europe,
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 59, at 488 (Oct. 5, 1992) [hereinafter Experts Warn].
40 U.N. Convention, supra note 5.
41 Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1409, 520 U.N.T.S. 204
(amended Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1441, 976 U.N.T.S. 3).
42 Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019
U.N.T.S. 175. See D.W. Sproule & Paul St-Denis, The UNDrug Trafficking Convention: An Ambi-
tious Step, 1989 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 263, 265.
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version into illicit traffic."43 Because they were primarily regulatory in
nature and did not provide for punishment of drug traffickers, these
conventions were not effective against the drug problem in the
1980s. 44
As a result of the weaknesses in these two prior conventions, the
United Nations held a conference in Vienna in the fall of 1988 to ex-
plore ways to combat the problem of international money laundering.
The result of the conference was the U.N. Convention. One hundred
and six nations adopted the U.N. Convention at the end of the Vienna
Conference on December 20, 1988. 45 As of April 1993, seventy-five na-
tions and the European Community had ratified the U.N.
Convention. 46
Under the U.N. Convention, each Party State agrees to make the
laundering of drug proceeds a criminal offense; 47 however, the U.N.
Convention primarily applies to international offenses. 4a Therefore,
its provisions would not apply to a case of purely domestic money laun-
dering. Specifically, each State agrees to make the following acts crimi-
nal offenses: the management or financing of the cultivation or
manufacture of psychotropic substances, 49 the conversion or transfer
of property derived from drug trafficking, 50 and the concealment or
disguise of the true nature of property derived from drug trafficking.51
The U.N. Convention's criminalization provisions are based upon U.S.
statutes criminalizing money laundering.52
The criminalization of money laundering under the U.N. Conven-
tion is subject to the constitutional and basic legal framework of each
43 Sproule & St-Denis, supra note 42, at 265.
44 David P. Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The UN Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 387, 390
(1990).
45 See U.N. Dept. of Pub. Info., 1991 U.N.Y.B. 737; U.N. Convention, supra note 5. The
U.N. Convention is divided into thirty-four articles.
46 The European Community signed the U.N. Convention on June 8, 1989, in New
York. North-South Cooperation in the Fight Against Drugs, BULL. E.C. 84 (Oct. 1985). In addi-
tion, the following nations have adopted the U.N. Convention as of April 1993: Afghanistan,
Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussia SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cote
d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, France, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Seychelles, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tuni-
sia, Uganda, Ukraine SSR, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emir-
ates, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. UN Money Laundering
Convention Gains Continued Support, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Apr. 1993, available in LEXIS,
Banks Library, MLA File.
47 Sproule & St-Denis, supra note 42, at 269.
48 Stewart, supra note 44, at 394.
49 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 3(a)(i).
50 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 3(b) (i).
51 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.
52 See MLCA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1988); Stewart, supra note 44, at 392.
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Party State. This provision could potentially undermine the effective-
ness of the Convention. 53 At the Vienna Conference, some nations
insisted on this limitation because of the lack of discretion in prosecut-
ing criminal offenses in some Party States. 54
Article 5 of the U.N. Convention requires Party States to empower
their courts to order the seizure of financial records in a money laun-
dering investigation.55 Bank secrecy laws cannot be an impediment to
this seizure.56 Additionally, each Party State must adopt measures that
will enable it to confiscate the proceeds of drug trafficking offenses.5 7
Article 5 also creates a procedure by which one nation can ask another
nation for assistance in confiscating the proceeds of drug offenses. 58
One nation may ask the competent authorities of another nation in
which the illegal proceeds are located to confiscate the proceeds. If
the competent authorities grant the request, the confiscating nation
shall enforce it under the U.N. Convention. 59 Each nation shall fur-
nish the U.N. Secretary-General with copies of laws giving effect to this
confiscation procedure.60 The removal of bank secrecy laws as a de-
fense to confiscation and the seizure of financial records prevents gov-
ernments from ignoring money laundering with an easy excuse.61
Moreover, even if drug proceeds are intermingled with legitimate
funds, they are still subject to confiscation under the U.N. Conven-
tion.62 Thus, money launderers cannot protect drug proceeds by mix-
ing them with legitimate funds.6 3
Article 7 of the U.N. Convention is, in essence, a mutual legal
assistance treaty.64 This provision states that the Party States shall pro-
vide the widest possible assistance to other states in enforcing drug
trafficking laws and that the bank secrecy laws shall not hinder this
rendering of assistance.65 Mutual legal assistance includes providing
originals of bank records and identifying or tracing drug proceeds.66
Similarly, a Party State may not rely on its bank secrecy laws as grounds
for declining to give mutual legal assistance to another Party State.67
Additionally, the State requesting legal assistance can ask the re-
53 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 3(c)(2); Stewart, supra note 44, at 392.
54 Stewart, supra note 44, at 392.
55 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(3); Sproule & St-Denis, supra note 42, at 281.
56 Sproule & St-Denis, supra note 42, at 281.
57 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(1).
58 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(4).
59 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(4)(f).
60 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(4)(f).
61 Sproule & St-Denis, supra note 42, at 282.
62 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(6)(b)-(c); Sproule & St-Denis, supra note 42, at
283-84.
63 Sproule & St-Denis, supra note 42, at 283-84.
64 Id. at 285.
65 Id at 285-86.
66 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 7(2).
67 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 7(5); Stewart, supra note 44, at 395.
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quested State to keep the assistance secret from the entity or individual
being investigated to the extent necessary to execute the request.68
The U.N. Convention also provides for the extradition of persons
accused of drug trafficking offenses. 69 The nation that apprehends
the alleged perpetrator may prosecute the offender if the nation where
the offense occurred declines to extradite or prosecute. 70
Other important provisions of the Convention include Article 20
which requires Party States to supply copies of statutes that implement
the provisions of the U.N. Convention to the U.N. Secretary General. 71
Also, the Commission of Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations can make recommendations for im-
provement of the effectiveness of the U.N. Convention.
The U.N. Convention, along with mutual legal assistance treaties,
will significantly aid the United States in prosecuting money launder-
ing. The U.N. Convention may indirectly discourage foreign invest-
ment in nations that have ratified the Convention 72 because it removes
bank secrecy laws as a method of protection for money launderers. 73
As more nations adopt the U.N. Convention and enact implementing
legislation, the distortion of foreign investment flows will diminish.
B. Basle Committee Principles
At the December 1988 meeting of the Basle Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision, the Committee adopted a Statement of Principles re-
garding money laundering. 74 The Committee stated that although a
bank supervisor's main responsibility is not to ensure that every bank-
6 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 7(14).
69 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 6; Bruce Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy: International
Enforcement of Money Movement and Related Matters-A United States Perspective, 22 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 465, 524 (1989). The U.N. Convention serves as an extradition treaty if
none otherwise exists between two signatory nations. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art.
6(3).
70 Zagaris, supra note 69, at 524.
71 U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. 20. The International Narcotics Control Board is
responsible for supervising the U.N. Convention and must prepare an annual report for the
U.N. General Assembly.
72 Zagaris, supra note 69, at 526.
73 Stewart, supra note 44, at 404.
74 See National Banks Alerted to Statement of Principles on Money Laundering, reprinted in 1
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,606 (Jan. 9, 1989); Duncan Alford, Basle Committee Mini-
mum Standards: International Regulatory Response to the Failure of BCCI, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 241 (1992). The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a group of twelve
nations whose banking regulatory authorities meet periodically to discuss banking supervi-
sion. These authorities have reached regulatory agreements in the past. The bank regula-
tory authorities of the following twelve nations are members of the Committee: Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
provides staff support for the Basle Committee. The BIS is an organization of central banks
that serves as both a forum where central bankers meet to discuss current financial issues and
as an international financial institution. See generally James V. Hackney & Kim L. Shafer, The
Regulation of International Banking: An Assessment of International Institutions, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REc. 474 (1986).
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ing transaction is legitimate, bank supervisors cannot be indifferent to
the criminal use of the banking system.75 If banks are involved in
money laundering, public confidence in the banking system will be
weakened. Any association with criminals, whether through negli-
gence or a bank officer's direct involvement, will undermine confi-
dence in the soundness and integrity of the banking system.76
The Statement, like other Basle Committee documents, is not a
binding legal agreement; rather, it is a statement of best practice
agreed to by bank regulators.77 The implementation of the Statement
of Principles depends on the actions of domestic banking regulators. 78
Additionally, the Statement notes that if a nation has more stringent
requirements than those in the Statement, the more stringent require-
ments control.79
According to the Statement, a bank should make reasonable ef-
forts "to determine the true identity of" its customers,80 commonly re-
ferred to as the know-your-customer rule. A bank should explicitly
state that it will not conduct significant business with that customer
without adequate identification.81 In addition, banks should cooper-
ate fully with law enforcement officials to the extent allowed by local
confidentiality rules.8 2 When banks believe that deposits are the pro-
ceeds of criminal activity, they should take appropriate measures such
as severing relations with that customer or closing or freezing the af-
fected accounts.83 Furthermore, banks should adopt formal policies
implementing the Statement of Principles.8 4
The know-your-customer rule discourages the use of banks by
money launderers. 85 Because banks require evidence of the true iden-
tity of customers, depositors of illicit proceeds will look elsewhere to
launder their money. Unfortunately, the Statement's recognition of
banks' need to adhere to local confidentiality rules weakens the aid
banks can give in jurisdictions with such rules. However, the removal
of the protection of bank secrecy laws by the U.N. Convention 86 and
the European Convention8 7 will, to a certain degree, counteract this
75 Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, re-
printed in 1 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 11,785 (Sept. 27, 1991).
76 Id.
77 Id. Best practice generally means the standards and procedures that are regarded as
the most effective by industry peers.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Meltzer, supra note 3, at 238.
86 See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
87 See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
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limitation in the Basle Committee's Statement of Principles.88
C. G- 7 Task Force
In the summit communique at the 1989 Economic Summit held
in Paris, the world's seven largest industrialized nations (the G-7) cre-
ated a task force to make recommendations on combatting money
laundering.8 9 In the communique, the G-790 also urged that all na-
tions ratify the U.N. Convention.91
The G-7 task force issued its first report in April 1990 making forty
separate recommendations.92 The aim of the task force was not to
make banks into police officers, but to recommend ways to protect
banks from civil and criminal liability for disclosure of customer infor-
mation to law enforcement authorities.93 The task force concluded
that banks should be able to report suspicious transactions to law en-
forcement authorities without the fear of violating bank secrecy laws.9 4
Additionally, the task force recommended that nations should con-
sider creating a central system for reporting all large monetary
transactions.9
5
The report urged all nations to ratify the U.N. Convention that
criminalizes money laundering of drug proceeds and, in addition, to
criminalize laundering proceeds from all criminal activity. 96 Accord-
ing to the 1990 G-7 report, money laundering at that time was a crimi-
nal offense in Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. 97 Belgium, Germany, Swe-
den, and Switzerland were considering criminalizing money launder-
ing, but money laundering was not a criminal offense in Spain, Austria,
or Japan.98
The April 1990 report also urged all nations to enact seizure and
88 See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
89 Paris Economic Summit: Economic Declaration, July 16, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
1293, 1299 (1989).
90 See infra note 92.
91 See infra note 92.
92 Treasury Releases G-7 Report Calling for Cooperation Against Money Laundering, Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 54, at 703 (Apr. 23, 1990) [hereinafter Treasury Releases]. Bank regulators
and law enforcement officials of the industrialized nations, but no private bank officials,
served on the task force. PILECKI, supra note 8, at 97. Nations who sent representatives to the
task force included the G-7: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. In addition, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland sent representatives. Treasury Official Cites International
Progress Toward Curbing Money Laundering, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 54, at 796 (May 7, 1990).
93 Task Force Adopts Proposal to Fight Drug Money Laundering, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 54,
at 312-13 (Feb. 19, 1990).
94 Treasury Releases, supra note 92, at 703.
95 Id
96 d.
97 Id.
98 Id
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forfeiture laws with respect to laundered money.99 It recognized the
need for a network among law enforcement officials and bank regula-
tors to cooperate in combatting money laundering,100 and it urged na-
tions to cooperate at all stages of the investigation and prosecution of
money laundering. 101
The G-7 task force recommended that all financial institutions fol-
low the Basle Committee Statement of Principles regarding money
laundering, particularly the know-your-customer rule. 10 2 In addition,
financial institutions should maintain records of transactions for at
least five years and should train their employees to detect money laun-
dering.10 3 The task force, recognizing that money launderers use vari-
ous institutions to launder drug proceeds, stated that its
recommendations should apply to all financial institutions, not just
commercial banks.10 4
In its April 1990 report, the task force failed to address the prob-
lem of wire transfers because the members could not agree on the
need for a central reporting system like that which exists in the United
States. 105
Each year, the G-7 task force monitors a group of nations for com-
pliance with its recommendations on money laundering enforcement.
In its latest report, issued in the summer of 1993, the task force ex-
amined eight nations-Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Switzerland, and the United States-and made
recommendations for improvement.' 0 6 This is an ongoing process.
IV. European Regulations
A. Council of Europe Convention
On September 12, 1990, the Council of Europe followed the lead
of the United Nations and the G-7 industrialized nations in combatting
international money laundering by adopting the Convention on Laun-
dering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds from Crime (Eu-
ropean Convention).' 0 7  Twelve nations signed the European
99 PILECKI, supra note 8, at 98.
100 Treasuiy Releases, supra note 92, at 703.
101 PiEEcju, supra note 8, at 98.
102 Jl See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
103 PILECKI, supra note 8, at 98.
104 id.
105 Id.
106 Annual FATF Report Puts Eight Countries Under Microscope, MONEY LAUNDERiNG ALERT,
Aug. 1993, available in LEXIS, Banks Library, MLA File.
107 Nilsson, supra note 33, at 421. The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 as the
first European political association. Twenty-two nations are members of the Council. See
generally GERMAIN'S TRANSNATIONAL LAW RESEARCH: A GUIDE FOR AoiRNEYS (1992).
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Convention in 1990,108 and ultimately eighteen nations signed it.10 9
The European Convention seeks to provide a complete set of
rules dealing with cooperative efforts among European nations in com-
batting money laundering and prosecuting money launderers. 110 The
European Convention deals with the initial investigation of money
laundering, the securing of evidence, the confiscation of criminal pro-
ceeds, and international law enforcement cooperation.111
Chapter II, Article 2 of the European Convention suggests that
nations adopt legislation to enable them to confiscate proceeds of
crime.11 2 A nation is allowed to set out reservations to the types of
crimes that are subject to the Convention's provisions and, thus, na-
tions can tailor the scope of applicability of the European Convention
within their borders. 113 Article 6 mandates that money laundering be
made a criminal offense by each signatory nation. 114 This Article also
allows nations to criminalize negligent money laundering by financial
institutions." 5 Thus, banks that inadvertently aid in the laundering of
money may be subject to criminal prosecution.
The European Convention provides nations with the ability to
identify and trace criminal proceeds." 6 Law enforcement authorities
can seize bank records. Financial institutions, however, cannot use
bank secrecy laws as an excuse not to provide records to law enforce-
ment authorities. 1 7
The European Convention encourages international cooperation
among law enforcement authorities at all stages of the enforcement
process from the investigation of criminal activity to the freezing of
criminal proceeds. 118 Also, during or after adjudication, authorities
are required to cooperate in the enforcement of confiscation or-
ders. 1 9 Bank secrecy is not a ground for refusal to cooperate in the
enforcement of confiscation orders. 120 In addition, if banks are asked
108 These twelve nations were Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Twelve Council of
Europe Members Sign Pact to Crack Down on Money Laundering, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 55, at
838 (Nov. 19, 1990). France, Finland, Ireland, and Switzerland signed later. Id.
109 These nations were Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Greece, and Australia. The United Kingdom was the first nation to
ratify the European Convention in September 1992. Experts Warn, supra note 39, at 489.
110 Nilsson, supra note 33, at 425-26.
111 Id.
112 European Convention, supra note 5, ch. II, art. 2.
113 European Convention, supra note 5, ch. II, arts. 2, 6.
114 European Convention, supra note 5, ch. II, art. 6.
115 European Convention, supra note 5, ch. II, art. 6(3)(a).
116 European Convention, supra note 5, ch. II, arts. 3, 4.
117 Nilsson, supra note 33, at 430.
118 Id. at 433.
119 Id.
120 European Convention, supra note 5, ch. III, art. 18(6)-(7); Nilsson, supra, note 33, at
437-38.
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to assist in the investigation of a crime, signatory nations must pass laws
that prohibit banks from informing their customers of any ongoing
criminal investigation.1 2 1 Furthermore, all information requests be-
tween governments must be kept confidential. 122
The European Convention is nearly identical to the U.N. Conven-
tion; however, there are two significant differences between the agree-
ments. First, the U.N. Convention outlaws participation in money
laundering. In contrast, the European Convention does not outlaw
participation. Second, the European Convention applies to money
laundering of all criminal proceeds, not just the proceeds from illicit
drug trafficking as the U.N. Convention does. 123 Thus, because of its
larger scope, the European Convention has a greater potential than
the U.N. Convention as a tool for the control of money laundering.
B. European Community Directive on Money Laundering
The European Community (EC) has also taken steps to combat
money laundering. EC leaders face a dilemma in implementing the
Europe 1992 program.1 24 On one hand, the Europe 1992 program
aims to liberalize capital flows within the EC.125 On the other hand,
the liberalization of capital flows may allow drug traffickers to more
easily launder the proceeds of their drug activities, thus undermining
the stability of the European financial system. 126 In 1991, the EC
Council of Ministers adopted the Directive on the Prevention of the
Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering (the
Directive) .127 The purpose of the Directive was to prevent the launder-
ing of drug proceeds while encouraging the liberalization of capital
flows within the EC. EC officials also believe that the Directive will aid
in preventing criminals from taking advantage of the open borders
that will result from the Europe 1992 program.1 28
To further strengthen its anti-money laundering effort, the Euro-
pean Commission proposed a directive on money laundering on Feb-
121 European Convention, supra note 5, ch. II, art. 33.
122 European Convention, supra note 5, ch. III, art. 33.
123 Konstantin D. Magliveras, Defeating the Money Launderer-The International and European
Framework, 1992J. Bus. L. 161, 164-65.
124 Europe 1992 is a program whereby member nations of the EC will remove most trade
barriers among themselves. The European Council of Ministers passes directives that in turn
must be implemented by member States through enabling legislation. See generally P.S.R.F.
MATMJSEN, A GUIDE TO EuRoPEAN COMMUNrY LAw (1990). The Maastricht Treaty, which
became effective on November 1, 1993, provides that the European Community be renamed
the European Union. See Mastricht Treaty on Political Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247,
255 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993).
125 See generally P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EuRoPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1990).
126 Bruce Zagaris & Markus Bornheim, Cooperation in Fight Against Money Laundering in
Context of European Community Integration, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 54, at 119 (Jan. 22, 1990).
127 Directive, supra note 10, at 77.
128 Magliveras, supra note 123, at 169.
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ruary 14, 1990.129 The proposal directly resulted from the adoption of
the U.N. Convention and the European Convention. 130 The proposed
money laundering directive had three aims: (1) to prohibit money
laundering in all Member States, (2) to require credit and financial
institutions to facilitate the criminal investigation of money laundering
by reporting suspicious transactions, and (3) to regulate all professions
that handle cash transactions, such as foreign exchange operations
and casinos.131
The Council of Ministers adopted the final version of the Direc-
tive on June 10, 1991.132 At that time only five Member States had
criminal money laundering statutes.' 3 3 In its preamble, the Directive
refers specifically to the U.N. Convention and the European Conven-
tion and states that it is designed to implement the policies behind the
two Conventions. 134 The preamble also states that the Directive ap-
plies to the proceeds of all criminal activity, not just drug trafficking
offenses. 135
Article I states that the Directive applies to credit and financial
institutions, both of which are broadly defined in the Second Banking
Directive.' 36 Furthermore, the Directive applies to professions whose
129 Proposal for a Council Directive on Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the
Purpose of Money Laundering, 1990 O.J. (CI06) 6 [hereinafter Proposed Directive]. See also,
Proposal to Make Money Laundering a Crime Throughout the EC Offered, Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 54, at 312 (Feb. 19, 1990) [hereinafter Proposal].
130 See Proposed Directive, supra note 129, at 6.
131 Magliveras, supra note 123, at 170.
132 European Update, Banking and Financial Services (D.R.T.) 1991 WL 11696, at 76.
133 Id. France and Luxembourg's statutes (e.g., Law No. 87.1157 dated Dec. 12, 1987
(Loi Chalondon)) covered drug proceeds. The United Kingdom's statute (Drug Trafficking
Offense Act) covered drug proceeds and terrorism. The Italian and Belgian statutes (e.g.,
Italian Criminal Code § 648) covered all criminal activities.
134 Directive, supra note 10, at 77.
135 Id. The Europe Convention applies to all criminal proceeds, not just proceeds from
drug trafficking.
136 Directive, supra note 10, art. 1. Credit and financial institutions are those involved in
the following activities:
1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public.
2. Lending.
3. Financial leasing.
4. Money transmission services.
5. Issuing and administering means of payment (e.g. credit cards, travellers'
cheques and bankers' drafts).
6. Guarantees and commitments.
7. Trading for own account or for account of customers in:
(a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs, etc.);
(b) foreign exchange;
(c) financial futures and options;
(d) exchange and interest rate instruments;
(e) transferable securities.
8. Participation in share issues and the provision of services related to such
issues.
9. Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related
questions, and advice and services relating to mergers and the purchase of
undertakings.
10. Money brokering.
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activities are likely to further or aid money laundering,13 7 and to insur-
ance companies and branches of non-EC based financial
institutions.13 8
Article 2 requires Member States to prohibit money launder-
ing.139 The definition of money laundering in the Directive is based
upon the definition in the U.N. Convention, but the Directive's defini-
tion is expanded to include the proceeds of any crime, not just drug
trafficking.1 40 The Directive allows each State, when it implements the
Directive, to define the "serious crime [s]" that fall within the ambit of
the Directive.1 41 Thus, in its implementing legislation defining "seri-
ous crime [s]," a Member State may list fewer crimes than other states,
thereby narrowing the coverage of the Directive.' 42
This prohibition against money laundering has created legal
problems because the Treaty of Rome does not provide for the harmo-
nization of criminal laws among Member States and does not grant the
EC jurisdiction in criminal matters.143 The Member States debated
whether the Directive could require Member States to make money
laundering a criminal offense.144 To resolve this question, rather than
stating that the Member States must make money laundering a crime,
the proposed directive stated that money laundering shall be prohib-
ited. 145 Therefore, rather than making money laundering a crime by
action of the EC, the Member States agreed among themselves to
criminalize money laundering.
The Directive, in Article 3, mandates that financial institutions ob-
tain identification of customers when they open certain types of ac-
counts or safe deposit boxes.1 46 Financial institutions are required to
obtain the true identity of customers in a transaction consisting of
more than 15,000 ECUs147 or when they suspect money laundering. 148
Banks must retain records documenting these transactions for five
years.149 Bank-to-bank transactions are not subject to an identification
11. Portfolio management and advice.
12. Safekeeping and administration of securities.
13. Credit reference services.
14. Safe custody services.
Second Council Directive, 89/646, art. 18, annex, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 9-10, 13.
137 Directive, supra note 10, art. 12 (e.g., attorneys and title agents).
138 European Update, supra note 132, at 67.
159 Directive, supra note 10, art. 2.
140 Proposal, supra note 129, at 312.
141 1&,
142 See i4d
143 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY], Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Proposal, supra note 129, at 312; PILECKI, supra note 8, at 199.
144 Proposal, supra note 129, at 312.
145 Id.
146 Directive, supra note 10, art. 3.
147 Id.
148 Directive, supra note 10, art. 3(6).
149 Directive, supra note 10, art. 4.
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requirement. 150 This exemption may create a loophole for money
launderers by allowing them to launder money through interbank
transfers. Of course, the money launderer first must convince a bank
to accept the initial deposits of drug proceeds. In essence, therefore,
Article 3 implements the know-your-customer principle expressed in
the Basle Statement.' 1"
Article 7 of the Directive, moreover, requires banks to refuse to
complete transactions that they suspect are money laundering-related
until the bank has an opportunity to inform law enforcement offi-
cials. 152 Bank employees are generally required to cooperate with law
enforcement officials.' 53 Employees and officers of banks must on
their own initiative inform law enforcement officials of any facts indi-
cating that money laundering has occurred in their institution, 5 4 but
they may not tell a customer about an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion.155 Bank employees, however, are immune from liability for a
good faith disclosure of confidential customer information. 156 Law
enforcement officials can use information given by bank officers only
in money laundering investigations 5 7 and must share this information
and other information obtained during bank examinations with their
counterparts in other Member States.' 5 8 The Directive purposely
avoided a currency transaction reporting system like that in the United
States because the transaction reporting system does not distinguish
between normal and suspect transactions. 59 Finally, the European
Commission must draft a report on the implementation of the Direc-
tive by January 1, 1994, and during each three year period
thereafter.' 60
There is a tension between the Directive's increased regulatory
burden on banks and the free movement of capital under the Europe
1992 program.' 6 ' The Directive places a significant burden on banks
to detect money laundering.162 Article 5 requires financial institutions
to scrutinize suspicious transactions. 163 This investigatory burden and
the resulting increased costs may dampen the competitiveness of Euro-
150 Directive, supra note 10, art. 3(7).
151 See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
152 Directive, supra note 10, art. 7.
153 Directive, supra note 10, art. 6.
154 Smith, supra note 3, at 132.
155 Directive, supra note 10, art. 8.
156 Directive, supra note 10, art. 9.
157 Directive, supra note 10, art. 6(3); Magliveras, supra note 123, at 173.
158 Magliveras, supra note 123, at 173.
159 European Update, supra note 132, at 70.
160 Directive, supra note 10, art. 17. The European Commission is the executive body of
the EC. See generally GERMAIN'S TRANSNATIONAL LAw RESEARCH: A GUIDE FOR ATrORNmS
(1992). As of March 1994, the European Commission's report on the Money Laundering
Directive was not publicly available.
161 Smith, supra note 3, at 135.
162 IJ
163 Directive, supra note 10, art. 5.
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pean banks relative to banks of other nations that do not impose the
same costs on banks located in those nations. Implementation of the
know-your-customer principle will likely increase customer fees or de-
crease interest paid on customer accounts.1 64 The five-year document
retention requirement likewise will increase bank costs. 165 The identi-
fication requirement of bank customers may discourage customers'
business, even legitimate business, because customers may be uncom-
fortable revealing information which, until now, was not required.
166
The Directive attacks secrecy barriers in the EC by granting bank offi-
cials immunity from liability pursuant to the good faith disclosure of
confidential customer information. 167
Opposition by a Member State to the Directive's provisions or a
weak implementation of the provisions by a Member State may disrupt
the European financial system and direct capital flows to the nation
with the most lax iegulation. 168 Money launderers will seek to deal
with financial institutions in nations with the weakest anti-money laun-
dering laws. Under the Directive, Member States have flexibility in de-
fining "serious crime" and can thus broaden or narrow the scope of
the Directive by including or excluding certain crimes from the defini-
tion. To counter this flexibility and potential weakening of the Direc-
tive, Member States must verify that fellow members are implementing
the Directive in the spirit in which it was proposed 169 to ensure that
money launderers do not find a safe haven within the EC.
V. Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses of the
Organization of American States
Like the EC, the Organization of American States (OAS) has en-
couraged its members to outlaw money laundering. The Inter-Ameri-
can Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the OAS approved
the Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses Connected
to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Related Offenses' 70 in March 1992. The
General Assembly of the OAS 71 adopted the Model Regulations in
May 1992172 in order to implement previous regional resolutions on
money laundering 173 and the U.N. Convention. The General Assem-
164 Smith, supra note 3, at 132.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 131.
167 Directive, supra note 10, art. 9.
168 Smith, supra note 3, at 136. Luxembourg, which has become an important financial
center in Europe, apparently opposed some of the Directive's provisions.
169 The spirit of the U.N. Convention and the Europe Convention are also relevant.
170 See Model Regulations, supra note 11.
171 The Organizations of American States is an international body consisting of govern-
ments in the Western Hemisphere and headquartered in Washington, D.C. See generally
GERMA1N'S TRANSNATIONAL LAW RESEARCH: A GUIDE FOR AroRNEVs (1992).
172 OAS Adopts Money Laundering Proposals, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, June 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, Banks Library, MLA File.
173 See, e.g., Caribbean States Meet, Issue Laundering Declaration, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT,
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bly urged member governments in turn to adopt and implement the
Model Regulations. The Model Regulations have no legal force them-
selves; rather, member governments must enact domestic legislation
implementing its provisions in order to create legally binding
obligations.
The Model Regulations apply to the laundering of the proceeds
obtained from drug trafficking and incorporate the U.N. Convention's
definition of drug trafficking. 174 The Model Regulations criminalize
the laundering of proceeds of illicit drug trafficking. 175 Laundering
offenses can include the conversion or transfer of property, the use of
property, and the concealment of the true origin of property.176 The
Model Regulations also provide for the seizure, 177 forfeiture, 178 and
disposition of illicit drug traffic proceeds. 179
The Model Regulations place additional regulatory burdens on fi-
nancial institutions. Under the Model Regulations, the definition of a
financial institution includes commercial banks, savings banks, thrifts,
securities brokers and dealers, currency dealers, check cashing serv-
ices, and funds transmitters.18 0 In addition, member governments may
extend application of the Model Regulations to sellers of real estate
and luxury items, casinos, and providers of professional services.'
8
'
A financial institution must maintain accounts in the name of the
account holder and cannot open anonymous accounts.' 82 The finan-
cial institutions must identify their customers and generally follow the
know-your-customer rule.183 Financial institutions must maintain cus-
tomer records for five years to show compliance with the Model
Regulations. 184
The Model Regulations require financial institutions to provide
information to law enforcement authorities when requested, 85 but do
not allow the financial institutions to notify the customer of the in-
quiry. 186 Bank secrecy or confidentiality laws cannot prohibit the
bank's disclosure of information to law enforcement authorities.
8 7
available in LEXIS, Banks Library, MLA File (describing the adoption of the Kingston Decla-
ration on Money Laundering).
174 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 1(4).
175 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 2. Illicit traffic is defined as the offenses
criminalized by the U.N. Convention.
176 Id.
177 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 4.
178 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 5.
179 Model Regulations, supra note 11, arts. 6-8.
180 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 9.
181 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 16.
182 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 10.
183 Id. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text for discussions of the know-your-
customer rule.
184 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 10.
185 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 11(1).
186 Id.
187 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 11(4).
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The OAS also created a currency transaction reporting system
under the Model Regulations. 188 The Model Regulations specify the
contents of the currency reports that financial institutions must file.189
Again, bank secrecy laws cannot prohibit the filing of these reports. 190
Financial institutions must report suspicious transactions to law
enforcement authorities. 191 Financial institutions must "pay special at-
tention to all complex, unusual or large transactions, whether com-
pleted or not, and to all unusual patterns of transactions."1 92 The
good faith disclosure of a suspicious transaction exempts the financial
institution and its employees from civil, administrative, and criminal
liability for the disclosure. 193
Any financial institution intentionally involved in money launder-
ing is subject to severe sanctions, including suspension of its charter or
revocation of its license.194 The Model Regulations require financial
institutions to implement compliance programs for the detection of
money laundering. 95 These programs must include know-your-cus-
tomer programs and designate a compliance officer who will oversee
the program. 196
Under the Model Regulations, each member government has the
obligation to enforce the provisions of the Model Regulations, to su-
pervise and regulate financial institutions, and to share information
with law enforcement authorities and regulators of other member
governments.1 97 Generally, member governments are required to co-
operate among themselves in the enforcement of the Model
Regulations. 198
Thus, the Model Regulations are a detailed set of provisions
aimed at decreasing money laundering of drug proceeds in the West-
ern Hemisphere. The Model Regulations apply to financial institu-
tions, broadly defined to include almost any entity that deals with large
amounts of cash.' 99 Financial institutions can no longer open anony-
mous accounts and must require true identification of all customers,
particularly corporate customers. This prohibition against anonymous
accounts is a significant change in the typical banking practices of sev-
eral OAS member nations.200
188 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 12.
189 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 12(2).
190 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 12(9).
191 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 13(2).
192 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 13(1).
193 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 13(4).
194 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 14(2).
195 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 15.
196 These provisions are similar to the those enacted in the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money
Laundering Act. See infra notes 239-79 and accompanying text.
197 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 17.
198 Model Regulations, supra note 11, arts. 17-18.
199 Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 9.
200 Certain South American countries allow financial institutions to open customer ac-
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The Model Regulations follow the U.S. lead by implementing a
currency transaction reporting system. The European Convention and
the EC Directive decided against taking this approach. 20 1 The Model
Regulations, however, ignore the increasingly prevalent use of wire
transfers by money launderers. The requirement of reporting suspi-
cious transactions may be one way to regulate some of these wire trans-
fers that are otherwise not subject to the currency transaction
reporting requirement.
The Model Regulations make clear that bank secrecy and confi-
dentiality laws can not prohibit compliance with its provisions. The
removal of the bank secrecy defense is specifically referred to in Arti-
cles 11 and 12202 and is referred to generally in Article 19.203
The Model Regulations set out detailed provisions aimed at
prohibiting money laundering. It remains to be seen how many and to
what extent governments will accept these provisions. Current U.S.
money laundering statutes implement nearly all of the provisions of
the Model Regulations.
VI. U.S. Money Laundering Statutes
A. The Bank Secrecy Act and the Money Laundering Control Act
In the 1980s, the United States led the world in passing legislation
to combat money laundering. The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and its
various amendments 20 4 are the cornerstone of U.S. efforts to combat
money laundering. The BSA applies to financial institutions only20 5
counts anonymously. See Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr., Drug Money Clouds Skyline of Panama City,
Cui. Titus., Jan. 31, 1993, at C21.
201 See supra notes 107-23, 159 and accompanying text.
202 Article 11 of the Model Regulations deals with the availability of the records of a
financial institution, Model Regulations, supra note 11, art. 11. Article 12 deals with the
currency reporting system. Id. art. 12.
203 Id. art. 19 (general prohibition against bank secrecy laws).
204 Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5311-5314, 5316-5324 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992)); Money Laundering Control Act, Pub.
L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324-
5326 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992)) [hereinafter MLCA]; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L.
100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5325,
5326 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992)).
205 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (1988). Financial institution means:
A. an insured bank (as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(h)));
B. a commercial bank or trust company;
C. a private banker;
D. an agency or branch of a foreign bank in the United States;
E. an insured institution (as defined in section 401(a) of the National
Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1742(a)));
F. a thrift institution;
G. a broker or dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et
seq.);
H. a broker or dealer in securities or commodities;
I. an investment banker or investment company;
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and requires them to report currency transactions in amounts greater
than $10,000.206 This reporting requirement is also part of a bank's
general regulatory examination. 2° 7 This reporting system has proven
to be expensive; since 1970, over 30 million currency transaction re-
ports (CTRs) have been filed, with each CTR taking approximately
twenty minutes to complete. 208
The other important U.S. money laundering statute is the Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MLCA). 209 This Act created three
criminal offenses: (1) a prohibition against the financial transactions
involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activities, (2) a prohibi-
tion against the international transportation of criminal proceeds, and
(3) a prohibition against monetary transactions in property constitut-
ing or deriving from proceeds obtained from criminal offenses. 210
With respect to the first offense, the statute defines "specified unlawful
activity" by reference to specific criminal statutes, generally involving
organized crime, drug trafficking, and financial misconduct.211 The
second offense reaches acts that would not be financial transaction of-
fenses or which are committed outside the United States.212 In passing
J. a currency exchange;
K. an issuer, redeemer, or cashier of travelers' checks, checks, money
orders, or similar instruments;
L. an operator of a credit card system;
M. an insurance company;
N. a dealer in precious metals, stones, or jewels;
0. a pawnbroker;
P. a loan or finance company;
Q. a travel agency;
R. a licensed sender of money;
S. a telegraph company
T. a business engaged in vehicle sales, including automobile, airplane, and
boat sales;
U. persons involved in real estate closings and settlements;
V. the United States Postal Service;
W. an agency of the United States Government or of a State or local
government carrying out a duty or power of a business described in this
paragraph;
X. any business or agency which engages in any activity which the Secretary
of the Treasury determines, by regulation, to be an activity which is similar to,
related to, or a substitute for any activity in which any business described in this
paragraph is authorized to engage; or
Y. any other business designated by the Secretary whose cash transactions
have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters.
Id.
206 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1988); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1992).
207 MLCA § 1359, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
208 Current Trends in Money Laundering: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommit-
tee on Investigation of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
344 (1992) [hereinafter Current Trends]. 7.6 million Form 4789s were filed in 1991. 66,573
Form 8300s were filed in 1991. Id. at 349.
209 MLCA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992). SeeJames D. Harmon,Jr.,
United States Money Laundering Laws: International Implications, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 1, 9-10 (1988).
210 Harmon, supra note 209, at 9-10.
211 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (7) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
212 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
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this Act, especially the third offense, Congress intended to make the
proceeds of drug crimes worthless by imposing criminal liability on any
person dealing with drug proceeds.213
These new criminal offenses are broad enough to apply to any
person assisting money launderers.214 Courts, however, have read a
scienter requirement of "knowing" the source of the property or pro-
ceeds into this statute. 215 Knowing blindness or intentional disregard
by banks meets this standard and may subject them to liability.2 16
Mere suspicion will not meet this standard.217 A defendant will be
found guilty under Section 1956 or Section 1957 if he knows that the
subject property was derived from some criminal activity; however, the
defendant need not know the specific offense. 218 Thus, any person
who transacts business with a drug dealer may be criminally liable for
violation of these anti-money laundering statutes.
In addition, the MLCA prohibits the structuring of transactions to
avoid the CTR requirement.219 This practice, known as "smurfing,"
has severely hampered the implementation of Congressional policy
to detect suspected money laundering transactions. 220 Smurfing is the
practice whereby a depositor will make a deposit in an amount slightly
less than $10,000 to avoid the reporting of the cash transaction. A
drug operation may make several deposits at different branches of
a bank in one day in amounts less than $10,000 in an effort to launder
the money without triggering the CTR requirement. Bank personnel,
therefore, must be very careful in giving any advice to customers that
may be interpreted as aiding the avoidance of the CTR
requirement.221
Furthermore, banks face the dilemma of either investigating a cus-
tomer's transaction to ensure that the source of the money is legal or
facing liability under Section 1957. If the bank reports the suspicious
transaction and it turns out to. be incorrect about its suspicion, the
bank may be liable under tort law.222 Banks may, however, voluntarily
inform law enforcement authorities of suspicious activity. The Right to
213 PeterJ. Kacarab, An Indepth Analysis of the New Money Laundering Statutes, 8 AKRON TAx
J. 1, 3-4 (1991).
214 Id. at 2-3.
215 See, e.g., United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1989).
216 Charles T. Plombeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control Act of
1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22 Ir'L LAw. 69, 72-73 (1988).
217 Id.
218 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992). See also Plombeck, supra note 216,
at 79 (discussing scienter requirements of statute).
219 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992). See generally Lara W. Short et al., The
Liability of Financial Institutions for Money Laundering, 109 BANKING LJ. 46, 56-60 (1992) (ana-
lyzing various courts' interpretations of the statute).
220 Short, supra note 219, at 52.
221 ROBERT E. PowIs, THE MONEY LAUNDERERS 307-08 (1992).
222 Short, supra note 219, at 56. See Ricci v. Key Bancshares, 662 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Me.
1987); See generally Elkan Abramowitz, Money Laundering and the Annunzio-Wylie Amendment,
N.Y. LJ., July 6, 1993. See infra notes 267-76 and accompanying text.
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Financial Privacy Act grants banks some immunity for the disclosure of
customer information when banks suspect money laundering activ-
ity.223 Nevertheless, the bank may be liable for wrongful disclosure.22 4
A bank, however, can disclose suspected criminal activity and the fol-
lowing customer information: customer name, account number, and
the nature of the illegal activity. 2 2 5 Banks may take advantage of a lim-
ited defense for the good faith disclosure of this information. 22 6 How-
ever, these disclosure provisions appear to contradict the reporting
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act.22 7 Banks, therefore, cannot aid
in the laundering of money; yet, if they disclose too much information,
they may be subject to a defamation claim by their customer. 228
A court can also order a bank not to inform a customer that the
customer's bank records have been subpoenaed or that customer in-
formation has been disclosed to a grand jury.2 2 9
In addition, money laundering is also included within the defini-
tion of racketeering in the Racketeering Influence Corrupt Organiza-
tion (RICO) statute, and a bank suspected of money laundering may
be subject to prosecution under that statute. 23 0
The 1988 Money Laundering Prosecution Improvement Act im-
posed additional liability on accomplices of money launderers.
2 3 1
Bank officials are subject to civil fines for willful or grossly negligent
violations of the CTR requirements. 23 2 The definition of financial in-
stitutions was expanded to include sellers of vehicles and persons han-
dling real estate closings, so that they now must report cash
transactions. 23 3 Section 4702 of this statute allows the U.S. govern-
ment to negotiate accords with other nations which would allow na-
tions to track and to report large dollar transactions to U.S. law
enforcement authorities.234
As banks are required to take on more responsibilities for the de-
tection of money laundering, money launderers are switching to non-
bank financial institutions as vehicles for legitimizing criminal pro-
223 MLCA § 1353, 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
224 Id.
225 Id.; Plombeck, supra note 216, at 96-97.
226 Plombeck, supra note 216, at 96-97.
227 Meltzer, supra note 3, at 254.
228 Id.
229 MLCA § 1353, 12 U.S.C. § 3413(i) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
230 Short, supra note 219, at 62.
231 Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102
Stat. 4354 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 31 U.S.C.). Short, supra, note 219, at
63-64.
232 Short, supra note 219, at 63-64.
233 Id.
234 Treasuy Official Cites International Progress Toward Curbing Money Laundering, Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 54, at 796 (May 7, 1990).
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ceeds.23 5 Non-banks are generally not subject to these anti-money
laundering statutes and, unlike banks, are not examined on a regular
basis.236 Therefore, efforts to regulate non-banks to prohibit money
laundering are increasing. The federal government is considering sub-
jecting these non-banks to the same money laundering statutes and
currency reporting requirements that presently apply to banks.23 7
State governments are considering adopting uniform licensing re-
quirements for non-bank financial institutions.23 8
B. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act
As part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992,
the U.S. Congress passed the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering
Act (Annunzio-Wylie Act)239 The Act implements many of the rec-
ommendations of the G-7 Task Force.240 The principal motivations
behind the passage of the Act were the failure of the Bank of Credit
and Commerce International (BCCI) and the discovery that the fed-
eral government lacked the authority to close BCCI's offices in the
United States, despite BCCI's conviction on money laundering
charges.241
The Annunzio-Wylie Act raises the stakes for banks used in money
laundering. If an agency or branch of a foreign bank is convicted of
money laundering, the Federal Reserve Board must begin termination
proceedings against the bank.2 42 The foreign bank may lose its license
to operate in the United States.243 If a domestic bank headquartered
in the United States is convicted of money laundering, the appropriate
domestic bank regulator must hold a hearing to determine if the bank
should lose its charter or deposit insurance.2 44 Thus, these "death
penalty" provisions-loss of a bank charter or loss of deposit insur-
ance-discourage banks from inadvertently becoming involved in
money laundering. In addition to revoking a bank's charter, a conser-
vator may be appointed to take over a bank convicted of money laun-
235 These institutions include check cashing services and casa de cambio. Dean Foust,
The New Improved Money Launderers, Bus. WK., June 28, 1993, at 90.
236 Current Trends, supra note 208, at 350.
237 Put Non-Bank Firms in the Crosshairs to Combat Money Laundering, Panel Says, Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 59, at 840 (Dec. 21, 1992) [hereinafter Non-Bank Firms]
238 Id. at 841.
239 Annunzio-Wylie Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., & 31 U.S.C.).
240 Amy G. Rudnick &James M. Schwarz, Banks Must Gear Up for Comprehensive New Money
Laundering Law, BANKING POL'Y REP., Dec. 21, 1992, at 1.
241 Id. at 9; see generally 138 CONG. Rc. S17,912 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992).
242 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1507, 12 U.S.C. § 3105 (Supp. IV 1992).
243 Id.
244 Id. §§ 1502, 1503, 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(c), 1818 (Supp. IV 1992); see also 138 CONG. REC.
S17,912 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992).
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dering.245 The Act also imposes greater liability on individual bank
officials. A bank officer may be banned from the industry if he is con-
victed of money laundering or Bank Secrecy Act violations.246
To avoid losing its charter or deposit insurance, a bank must show
that it used its best efforts to prevent money laundering from occur-
ring.247 The bank carries the burden of proof on the following five
factors: (1) the extent of involvement of senior management in the
money laundering activity, (2) the bank's preventive measures against
money laundering, (3) the bank's cooperation with law enforcement
authorities, (4) the bank's new internal controls to prevent money
laundering implemented since the offense, and (5) the impact on the
community if the bank is closed.248
The Annunzio-Wylie Act also expanded the list of crimes that con-
stitute "specified unlawful activity"249 under the money laundering stat-
utes. They now include mail theft, food stamp fraud, kidnapping,
robbery, extortion, and violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.250
The Annunzio-Wylie Act allows the Secretary of the Treasury to
require all financial institutions, not just depository institutions, to re-
port cash transactions over $10,000 to the Internal Revenue Service on
Form 8300.251 The Act gives the Department of the Treasury authority
to promulgate know-your-customer rules which will be used in bank
examinations2 52 and to require financial institutions to report suspi-
cious transactions. 253 Banks must require identification of all custom-
ers and financial institutions with which they conduct business,
whether or not they have an account at the bank.2 54
The Annunzio-Wylie Act also requires the Department of the
Treasury to issue regulations by January 1, 1994, that identify which
non-bank institutions come within the definition of financial institu-
tion, and that specify the information that financial institutions must
submit to the federal government about their customers. 255 All finan-
245 Bush Signs Housing Bill with Sections on Relief GS&S, and Money Laundering, Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 59, at 619-20 (Nov. 2, 1992).
246 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1504, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (Supp. IV 1992).
247 Phillips G. Gay, Jr., Institutions Must Change Systems to Meet Law, MONEV LAUNDERING
ALERT, Mar. 1993, available in LEXIS, Banks Library, MLA File.
248 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1501, 12 U.S.C. § 93 (Supp. IV 1992).
249 "Specified unlawful activity" was previously defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988).
250 Annunzio-Wylie Act §§ 1534, 1536, 12 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp. IV 1992); see Rudnick &
Schwarz, supra note 240, at 12.
251 26 U.S.C. § 6501 (1988).
252 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1517, 12 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1992); see Mark Arend, Money
Laundering Law is (So Far) Mostly a Blessing, Am. BANKERs' Ass'N BANING J., Feb. 1993, at 69.
253 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1517, 12 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1992); see Rudnick &
Schwarz, supra note 240, at 11.
254 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1511, 31 U.S.C. § 5327 (Supp. IV 1992); see Gay, supra note
247, at 5.
255 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1511, 31 U.S.C. § 5327(a) (Supp. V 1992); see Rudnick &
Schwarz, supra note 240, at 12. Final regulations have not been issued. Regulations were
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cial institutions, not just banks, must institute compliance programs
that educate bank personnel on money laundering.256 Each program
must include: internal anti-money laundering policies and proce-
dures, employment of a compliance officer, employee training, and an
independent audit function to test the effectiveness of the program.2 57
As directed by the Annunzio-Wylie Act, several federal govern-
ment agencies collaborated on the development of a Uniform Crimi-
nal Referral Form.258 The purpose of the form is to standardize data
reported to the government and to facilitate the automation of the
data.2 59 Banks must file this Criminal Referral Form when they suspect
the occurrence of criminal activity.2 60 These forms require detailed
information and require banks to investigate, to a certain degree, the
suspected criminal activity. 261
The Act requires the Department of the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve Board tojointly'promulgate regulations relating to fund trans-
fers by January 1, 1994.262 Under these regulations, insured banks
must keep records of both domestic and international wire transfers
and non-banks must keep records of international transfers.263 Ear-
lier, the Treasury had proposed regulations on wire transfers, but they
were never issued in final form because of bank opposition and be-
proposed by the Federal Reserve and Department of the Treasury in summer 1993. 58 Fed.
Reg. 46014 (1993) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposed Aug. 31, 1993). See gener-
ally Amy G. Rudnick & Julie A. Stanton, Treasury and Fed Are Fashioning New Wire Transfer
Rules, BANKING PoL'v REP., Oct. 4, 1993, at 11.
256 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1517(b), 31 U.S.C. § 5314(a) (Supp. IV 1992); see Rudnick &
Schwarz, supra note 240, at 11.
257 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1517(b), 31 U.S.C. 5314(a) (Supp. IV 1992); see Rudnick &
Schwarz, supra note 240, at 11.
258 58 Fed. Reg. 3235-39 (1993) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 211, & 225) (pro-
posed Jan. 8, 1993). The Interagency Bank Fraud Working Group prepared this form. Id.
This Group consists of twelve federal agencies including the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the National
Credit Union Administration, the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, the Department of the Treas-
ury, and the Department of Justice.
259 Id
260 Id.
261 Robert J. Anello & Catherine M. Foti, Crime Prevention and Customer Confidentiality,
N.Y. Lj.,Jan. 14, 1993, at 5, 10-11 [hereinafter Crime Prevention]. The Act mandates the crea-
tion of an industry advisory group on reporting requirements. Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1564,
31 U.S.C. 5311 (Supp. IV 1992). The Department of the Treasury announced selection of
this group. Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,785 (1993); see also Treasury to Create Bank Secrecy Act
Advisory Group on Reporting Requirements, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 60, 830 (June 7, 1993). In
the late 1980s, the American Banking Association task force studying the federal govern-
ment's money laundering statutes and regulations recommended this type of advisory group.
135 CONG. REc. S5,556 (1989). The Federal Reserve Board's (FRB) involvement in the pro-
mulgation of the new wire transfer regulations in a way provides more industry input into
regulations in that the FRB tends to be more familiar with the needs of banking institutions.
Section 1564 of the Act created a Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group on Reporting Require-
ments. See Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,785-86 (1993) for details on the Group's membership.
262 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1511, 31 U.S.C. § 5327 (Supp. IV 1992); see Rudnick &
Schwarz, supra note 240, at 11.
263 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1515, 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b) (Supp. IV 1992); see Rudnick &
Schwarz, supra note 240, at 11.
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cause of questions about the regulation's effectiveness in relation to its
CoSt. 264 Since the Federal Reserve has a better understanding of wire
transfers, its involvement in drafting these new regulations should sig-
nificantly improve the regulations on wire transfers.265
Under the Annunzio-Wylie Act, financial institutions, not just
banks, are required to report suspicious transactions to law enforce-
ment authorities. 266 As in the MLCA, banks face a dilemma when re-
porting suspicious transactions. If they report too much information,
customers can file suit against banks for breach of the duty of confi-
dentiality. 267 If the banks report too little, the federal government can
allege violation of the Bank Secrecy Act and collaboration with money
launderers. 268 With the death penalty provisions of the Act (revoca-
tion of a bank's charter or loss of deposit insurance), the bank's di-
lemma is accentuated. The Act prohibits banks from notifying possible
suspects of the existence of a grand jury subpoena for bank records in
money laundering or narcotics cases. 269
To complicate matters, several states have recognized a bank's
duty to maintain customer confidentiality.270 In Young v. Chemical
Bank,271 a New York state court recognized a bank's duty of confidenti-
ality to its customers and a cause of action for breach of this duty.272
The court did note an exception to this duty of confidentiality where
the breach was justified.273 Justification included the issuance of a gov-
ernment subpoena or the commission of a crime against the bank,
such as fraud. 274 In a reargument of Young, a different judge on the
Supreme Court of New York County dismissed the plaintiff's complaint
and ruled that any damages suffered flowed from the criminal pro-
ceedings, not from the bank's disclosure.275 This second decision lim-
ited the development of a bank's duty of confidentiality.
The Annunzio-Wylie Act eliminates some of the banks' concerns
regarding liability for disclosure of customer information. The statute
states that banks shall not be liable under federal or state law for disclo-
264 Arend, supra note 252, at 69.
265 Id. The Federal Reserve Board of Governors, along with the Department of Treasury,
have proposed a version of these regulations. 58 Fed. Reg. 46,014 (1993) (to be codified at
31 C.F.R. § 103). Final regulations have not yet been promulgated.
266 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1517, 12 U.S.C. § 5344 (Supp. IV 1992); Gay, supra note 247, at
5.
267 RobertJ. Anello & Catherine M. Foti, Banks Still Face Risks Despite New BSA Safe Harbor,
MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Mar. 1993, available in LEXIS, Banks Library, MLA File [hereinaf-
ter Anello & Foti, Banks Still Face Risks].
268 Id,
269 Rudnick & Schwarz, supra note 240, at 12.
270 Anello & Foti, Banks Still Face Risks, supra note 267, at 3. Florida, Indiana, Maryland,
Idaho, and New York have recognized this duty.
271 N.Y. L.J., Aug. 7, 1992, at 23 (Supreme Ct. N.Y. County).
272 Anello & Foti, Crime Prevention, supra note 261, at 7.
273 Id. at 11.
274 Id.
275 N.Y. L.J., Apr. 21, 1993, at 21 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
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sure of customer information to law enforcement authorities. 276 This
safe harbor provision does not protect the bank from criminal liability,
only civil liability.27 7 Nevertheless, this provision is not all encompass-
ing and banks should consider the extent of their tort liability before
disclosing customer information.278 This protection, however, exceeds
that which was previously provided in the Right to Financial Privacy
Act, which merely provided a good faith defense to bank officials for
disclosure of limited information.2 79 This provision removes liability
for disclosure of any information to law enforcement authorities.
Therefore, while the Act raises the stakes of involvement in money
laundering, it also provides banks some protection for compliance with
the reporting requirements of the law.
C. Wire Transfers
Wire transfers present a particularly difficult problem for law en-
forcement officials. Wire transfers are sent over three primary pay-
ment systems: CHIPS, Fedwire, and SWIFT. 280 Payment orders rarely
identify the originating customer because of space limitations on the
system. 28 ' Thus, the order will merely state "our good customer."2 82
As a result, money launderers find funds transfers very useful because
the identity of the originating customer can be easily hidden.
Another reason money launderers are using wire transfers more
frequently is because law enforcement authorities have concentrated
on cash transactions to a greater degree than wire transfers.28 3 The
funds wire system's technical limitations prevent complete information
on the nature of the transaction to be passed to every bank involved in
the transfer.28 4 If the transfer passes through several banks, the last
bank in the sequence may have no information at all on the originat-
ing customer.28 5 In order to investigate a transaction, law enforce-
276 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1517(b), 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
277 Arend, supra note 252, at 69.
278 Anello & Foti, Banks Still Face Risks, supra note 267, at 3.
279 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c) (1988); see Rudnick & Schwarz, supra note 240, at 11.
280 Fedwire is managed by the Federal Reserve. CHIPS is the Clearing House of Interna-
tional Payment System. SWIFT is the Society for Worldwide International Financial Telecom-
munications. Fedwire and CHIPS settle payments. SWIFT is primarily a message system that
authorizes payments that are later settled on Fedwire or CHIPS. See Meltzer, supra note 3, at
246.
281 Id. at 247-48.
282 1&
283 135 CONG. REC. S5,556 (1989). Wire transfer regulations are being promulgated by
the Federal Reserve Board and Department of the Treasury pursuant to the Annunzio-Wylie
Act. Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1511, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp. IV 1992). The American Bankers'
Association noted in its 1989 report the use of wire transfers by money launderers and the
lack of law enforcement focus on wire transfers as opposed to cash transactions. Report of the
ABA Money Laundering Task Force, reprinted in 135 CONG. Rac. S5,555 (1989).
284 Sara Jane Hughes, Policing Money Laundering Through Funds Transfers: A Critique of
Regulation Under the Bank Secrecy Act, 67 IND. L.J. 283, 295-96 (1992).
285 Id.
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ment agencies must collect records from each bank involved in the
transaction, and these banks may be located in different jurisdictions.
The formats of the orders between banks may vary, and the orders use
special codes that require training to interpret.286 To make matters
even more difficult, wire transfers are settled very quickly, unlike
checks.287 The money launderers also may send the transfer through
jurisdictions with strict bank secrecy laws in order to make detection of
the true source of funds even more difficult.28 8
Many smaller banks use correspondent banks to complete custom-
ers' wire transfers. If a bank is not directly connected to a wire system,
the use of a correspondent bank adds another step to the transfer and
another level of complexity for law enforcement authorities to investi-
gate. As a result of the increased use of wire transfers by money laun-
derers and the difficulty of detecting suspect transactions, the
Annunzio-Wylie Act requires the promulgation of regulations dealing
with the reporting of wire transfers. 289  The Act left the details of
dealing with money laundering by wire transfer to bank regulators,
who must issue regulations by January 1994.290 These new reporting
requirements may make the United States an unattractive place for for-
eign investment even by legitimate investors.291
While these new regulations are being prepared, the Federal Re-
serve has issued a policy statement on large value funds transfers that
may constitute money laundering.292 The Federal Reserve's policy
statement implemented some of the recommendations of the G-7 Task
Force and focused on large funds transfers over Fedwire, CHIPS, and
SWIFT.29 3 The statement recommends that each payment order con-
'tain the following information: name of customer, address of cus-
tomer, account number, identity of the originating bank, and the
account number of the initiator of the transaction. 294 SWIFT, CHIPS
and the Bank of England recommended that each payment order con-
tain the information recommended by the G-7 Task Force. 295 The
Federal Reserve's policy statement recognizes that the Fedwire system
is more limited in the amount of information its payment orders can
contain and that banks must give priority to the information necessary
to complete the transaction. 296 Nevertheless, the statement urges
286 Id, at 296.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1511, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp. IV 1992).
290 See supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
291 Short, supra note 219, at 69.
292 79 Fed. Res. Bull. No. 2, 97 (1993). This statement was adopted on December 23,
1992. Id.
293 Use of Large Funds Transfers for Money Laundering Pu"oses, I Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 11,787 (Jan. 5, 1993).
294 Id
295 Id.
296 I&
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banks to use all the fields in the payment order to record information
about the originator or initiator of the transaction. 297 The Federal Re-
serve is studying changes to the Fedwire system that would allow banks
to comply more fully with the policies behind the statement by includ-
ing information on the initiator of the transaction. 298
The Federal Reserve supports a regulatory approach to maintain-
ing wire transfer records. 299 Because the wire transfer system contin-
ues to evolve as technology develops, regulations, rather than statutes,
will be more responsive to the competing aims of law enforcement and
the system's efficiency.
VII. Conclusion
The new money laundering statutes have forced banks to become
more aware of the money laundering problem and to take steps to
combat it. For example, the Puget Sound Bank headquartered in Ta-
coma, Washington, and purchased by Keycorp in 1992, runs a model
money laundering prevention program.30 0 The bank's board of direc-
tors approved a written know-your-customer policy.30 1 The policy re-
quires bank employees to make reasonable efforts to identify loan and
deposit customers, to make a reasonable effort to identify users of
other services, such as wire transfers and money orders, and to refuse
to conduct business with customers without proper identification.30 2
Banks generally have adopted new business policies to prevent
and detect money laundering. These new practices include knowing-
your-customer and the source of his funds, reporting suspicious trans-
actions, and strictly complying with money laundering statutes and
regulations.3 03
The U.S. government, both domestically through the Annunzio-
Wylie Act and internationally through the U.N. Convention, has
placed a heavier regulatory burden on banks in order to detect and
prevent money laundering. The question arises whether the cost of
the new regulations and the resulting changes in bank operations are
worth the improved prevention of money laundering and drug traffick-
ing. The answer is not clear.
These new laws and regulations require banks to bear an investiga-
tory burden that they are not equipped to handle. For a particular
transaction, a bank must determine if it is assisting in money launder-
297 Id.
298 See Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,366 (1993).
299 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, reprinted in 76 Fed. Rev.
Bull. No. 7, 517, 518 (1990) (statement by Clyde H. Farnsworth, Jr., Director, Division of
Federal Reserve Bank Operations).
300 Arend, supra note 252, at 70.
301 Id at 71
302 Id
303 Powis, supra note 221, at xiii.
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ing. The bank acting as judge and jury faces conflicting goals. The
bank wishes to serve customers quickly and efficiently, but at the same
time it does not want to be used as a vehicle for drug traffickers to
launder their profits in violation of the law.30 4 Therefore, the prudent
action is for the bank to complete the transaction and then report it to
the law enforcement authorities. 305 Reporting, however, increases the
bank's costs which are in turn passed on to its customers.
International payment systems currently are not set up to enable
banks to investigate all transactions. The technical aspects of payment
systems limit the amount of information in any payment order. Fur-
thermore, most banks are not members of a payment system and in-
stead use correspondent banks to wire money for their customers. Use
of correspondent banks prevents banks along the chain of the transac-
tion from obtaining information on the originating customer.306
Thus, as banks are being required to investigate the nature of transac-
tions more fully and money launderers are increasingly taking advan-
tage of the international payment system, the technological limits of
the system itself does not allow for an adequate investigation.
Because the Annunzio-Wylie Act has raised the stakes for banks,
either the payment system must be changed to accommodate banks'
new needs, or banks' responsibilities must be reasonably configured to
take into account the realities of investigating transactions. Banks
should not be subject to the "death penalty"30 7 unless they are given
the tools to avoid conviction. Banks must be given time to develop a
more sophisticated payment system that will allow information on the
originating customer to pass through each step of the transaction.
Banks' civil immunity for the disclosure of customer information to law
enforcement authorities should be broad enough to allow banks to
meet the added burdens of the anti-money laundering statutes and
regulations. Money laundering statutes should take into account the
realities of a bank's operations.
Finally, banks must wrestle with the conflicting goals of law en-
forcement and customer privacy. The government's objective is to pre-
vent money laundering as a way to enforce drug trafficking laws. The
banks' goal is to protect the confidentiality of their customers' finan-
cial information. The money laundering statutes and regulations have
placed banks in the uncomfortable position of weighing these two
goals and determining on a case-by-case basis whether a customer's de-
304 The G-7 task force pointed out that banks generally lack the expertise to determine
the source of funds, especially in the short period of time within which the bank must accept
or reject the transaction. 135 CONG. Rac. S5,557 (1989).
305 Cliff E. Cook, Complying with the Spirit of BSA: Know Your Customer Policies and Suspi-
cious Transactions Reporting, in BANK SECRECY (American Bankers Assoc. ed., 1991), reprinted in
Current Trends, supra note 208, at 333.
306 Meltzer, supra note 3, at 247.
307 See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
19941
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
sire and right for privacy should succumb to the government's policy
to prevent crime. Without adequate guidance and protection, banks
will not be able to make these decisions effectively. The immunity
from liability provision in the Annunzio-Wylie Act aids banks in this
regard.308 The new regulations authorized by the Act will provide
banks with additional guidance in making these decisions. Whether
this guidance will be adequate remains to be seen.
Law enforcement's focus on banks is misguided because money
launderers are increasingly using non-bank institutions as vehicles to
launder drug proceeds. As nations have stepped up the policing of
international money laundering, money launderers have switched to
non-bank financial institutions as vehicles to launder drug proceeds.309
Law enforcement authorities should distribute their efforts on the vari-
ous conduits of laundering drug proceeds in proportion to the volume
of money laundering occurring through that conduit. The future
challenge of regulators and law enforcement authorities is to combat
money laundering in those traditionally unregulated entities and to
tailor money laundering regulations applicable to commercial banks
to ensure that the increased regulatory burden and associated costs
produce an effective decrease in money laundering and drug traffick-
ing, not in bank profitability.
308 Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1517, 12 U.S.C. 5314 (g)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
Mg Non-Bank Firms, supra note 237, at 840. See generally Current Trends, supra note 208.
This report focuses on the use of non-bank financial institutions in money laundering.
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